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Abstract. The paper consider the skill-biased “share-altering” technical change hypothesis in a spatial 
general equilibrium model where skilled and unskilled individual may exhibit different preferences for local 
amenities. A main novelty –both for labour and urban economics- is that, under this hypothesis, skill-biased 
technical change can be readily represented by simple Cobb-Douglas production functions, rather than CES 
technologies. We then analyse the local labour markets equilibrium, where the adoption of new technologies 
may require an adequate proportion of skilled workers. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  During the last two decades much attention has been devoted to types of technical change that are 
biased towards skilled labour: see, e.g., Acemoglu (2002) and Per Krusell et al. (2000). Recently, Beaudry et 
al. (2010) have shown that skill-intensive PC technologies have been adopted in cities where highly educated 
workers were abundant. At the same time, new developments in urban economics have claimed that high 
levels of local human capital may attract even more educated workers, as in the “rise of the skilled city” 
story: see Glaeser (2008) for an overview. In particular, Berry and Glaeser (2005) have found that demand 
for high skilled workers has been rising in initially high skill cities. Also, for what it concerns education 
levels, there has been increased sorting across metropolitan areas.  
  This paper makes two main contributions. The first novelty, mainly technical, is that - in a model 
with two types of workers (skilled and unskilled) - skill-biased technical change can be given a Cobb-
Douglas, rather than a standard CES, representation.
1 This step exploits the “share-altering” technical change 
hypothesis put forward by Seater (2005), Seater and Peretto (2008) and Zuleta (2008). The idea is rather 
simple: consistently with observation, most modern innovations seem to raise the share parameter of skilled 
workers while keeping constant the total labour share. We show that, under the skill-biased share-altering 
hypothesis, we are able to replicate the results about endogenous skill-biased technology adoption that 
Beaudry et al. (2010) derive from a traditional CES approach. Second, we cast the share-altering hypothesis 
into a spatial Roback-type framework where firms and workers (be them skilled or unskilled) are free to 
move across locations. As in the basic spatial framework introduced by Glaeser (2008), we model both 
preferences and technology as Cobb-Douglas functions. However, when Glaeser proceeds to investigate 
local skill-premia, he drops the Cobb-Douglas specification in favour of a CES technology. We argue that 
this step, under the share-altering hypothesis, is unnecessary. 
  The second main contribution of the paper has to do with the implications from spatial equilibrium. 
We show that new, share-altering technologies can be profitable only when there is an adequate local 
proportion of skilled workers.
2 For this reason, areas endowed with amenities which are particularly 
attractive to the educated, are also likely to satisfy the requirements for the adoption of such new 
technologies. This is a distinctive mechanism from traditional agglomeration externalities. Areas that benefit 
from the adoption of share-altering skilled-biased technologies will also exhibit higher wages and rents. 
Finally, the skill-mix tends to increase further in areas where such technologies are adopted: in other words, 
the model predicts a disproportionate inflow of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. 
 
                                                 
1 Traditionally, Cobb-Douglas technologies have been considered unfit to represent skill-bias as emphasized, 
for example, by Acemoglu (2002, p.785-786). 
2 This implication is similar to those obtained by the matching model in Acemoglu (1996), where investment 
depends on the average skill level of the workforce. In Berry and Glaeser (2005), a higher the number of 
educated residents will generate more skilled entrepreneurs who hire skilled workers. In this perspective, the 
initial level of city skills crucially determine the future level of local skill demand. Our implication however 
is closest to Beaudry et al. (2010).   3
The paper is organized as follows. Section II.1 describes the basic Roback model, where skilled and 
unskilled individuals exhibit heterogeneous preferences foro local amenities. Then, in Section II.2, we 
discuss the implications of share-altering technical change. Section III concludes.  
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II.  THE MODEL 
 
  We consider a standard general equilibrium model, where firms and workers are perfectly mobile 
across areas: see Roback (1982,1988). The economy is composed of two areas, Area 1 and Area 2, which are 
endowed with different characteristics, affecting both local productivity and residents’ “quality of life”. In 
each area, firms produce an homogeneous good by using two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, and 
“land”. The good is traded competitively across areas. Workers earn a wage and consume both the produced 
good and “land”. For simplicity, the supply of “land” in each area is taken to be fixed and landowners are 
absentee. Since firms are assumed perfectly mobile between areas, profits will be equalized across the 
economy. Similarly, when mobility costs are absent, workers’ utility will be perfectly equalized across areas. 
For what it concerns individuals’ utility, we assume that each area possesses some local 
characteristics that affect the quality of life of both skilled and unskilled individuals. However, we postulate 
that there are other local features that affect the utility of skilled individuals only.
3 
We start by describing the features of spatial general equilibrium (which has become the standard 
analytical tool for the analysis of local labour markets: see Moretti 2008,2010) in the absence of technical 
change. 
 
1. The basic  framework 





c n n l , , , with  {} 2 , 1 = c . We first illustrate firms’ optimal behavior and, then, we look at skilled and 
unskilled workers, so to characterize the equilibrium in the two areas. 
  
  Firms. Firms in area  {} 2 , 1 = c  produce an homogeneous good by using land,  c L , and both skilled 




c N N , , with a Cobb-Douglas technology characterized by constant 
returns to scale: 
 
( ) ( )
β α β α u
c
s
c c c Y c N N L Q A Y ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
− − 1 ) (     (1) 
 
where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ + β α . The term  ) ( c Y Q A  denotes the impact of the vector  c Q  of local characteristics on 
firm’s productivity. We postulate that the elements of  c Q ,  ic q , are measured in a way such that 
0 / ≥ ∂ ∂ ic Y q A .
4  Respectively, {} c c p r ,  denote the local price of land (rent) and the price of the traded good. 
                                                 
3 This assumption is consistent, for example, with the findings in Carlino and Saiz (2008) for the US, and 
Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2010) for Italy, and is exploited also in some model extensions of Glaeser (2008).  
4 The vector of local characteristics affecting firms’ productivity,  c Q , does not necessarily coincide with 
local characteristics affecting residents’ utility.   5
In what follows, we will assume that  1 2 1 = = p p . The wage received by a skilled worker in area c is 
denoted by 
s
c w , while the unskilled wage is equal to 
u
c w . 
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  Skilled workers. Skilled workers living in area c maximize the utility function 
 
µ µ
c c c U c U
s
c Y L Z B X A U ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
− 1 ) ( ) (     (4) 
subject to the following budget constraint: 
 
s
c c c c w Y L r = + ⋅      (5) 
 
This skilled worker’s utility function includes an “amenity” term  ( ) c U X A , non-decreasing in the vector of 
local characteristics  c X , which is common to unskilled utility (see below). However, skilled utility also 
includes an additional “amenity” term  1 ) ( ≥ c U Z B , non-decreasing in  c Z . The vector  c Z  denotes some 
additional territorial characteristics that are valuable to skilled individuals, but irrelevant to the welfare of the 
unskilled. The optimal choice of the consumption bundle generates an indirect utility for a skilled resident in 
area  {} 2 , 1 = c  given by: 
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where 
µ µ µ µ η
− − ≡
1 ) 1 ( . A skilled worker is indifferent whether to migrate or not whenever the condition 
s s s v = = 2 1 ν ν  holds. Thus, it follows that: 
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  Unskilled workers. An unskilled worker in area c receives a wage equal to 
u
c w . By maximizing 
utility
5 subject to 
u
c c c c w Y L r = + ⋅ , one obtains the expression of the indirect utility of an unskilled worker 
who resides in region c: 
 








X A ,  { } 2 , 1 = c    (8) 
 
Free mobility of unskilled individuals implies that 
u u u v = = 2 1 ν ν . Then, the following equilibrium 
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Expression (9) shows that the relative wage among the unskilled depends on the rent ratio between areas. 
 
  Equilibrium in the absence of technical change. The relative rent ratio, the relative wage ratios 
among skilled workers and unskilled workers are obtained by solving the system given by equations (2), (7) 
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5 Unskilled utility has the same structure as skilled utility (4), except for the absence of the amenity term 
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These equilibrium expressions have standard interpretations. Equation (10) shows that local 
characteristics that increase productivity and welfare in Area 1 have a positive effect on rents, relative to 
Area 2. However, expression (11) emphasizes that relative abundance of local amenities in Area 1 reduces 
the relative skilled wage in this region. Finally, equation (12) shows that, if Area 1 is relatively richer in 
amenities that are mostly appreciated by the skilled,  1 Z , the unskilled wage in Area 1 tends to be relatively 
higher. This occurs because such specific amenities attract skilled workers to Area 1 and, for this reason, 
unskilled workers become more productive. 
 
 
  Relative population sizes across areas. The equilibrium derived above characterizes the relative 
prices (rents, wages) across the economy. We now derive the relative equilibrium sizes of skilled and 
unskilled populations in the two areas. Similarly to Roback (1988), the procedure to determine the 
equilibrium populations builds on the market-clearing conditions in the markets for skilled and unskilled 
labour in each area, respectively, 
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and in the market for land: we leave the details to Appendix A.1. In equilibrium, the proportion of skilled 















































































Expression (14) shows that skilled workers will tend to locate in Area 1 when productivity and both types of 
amenities  ) , ( 1 1 Z X  in Area 1 are high relative to Area 2. Thus, local characteristics that enhance 
productivity and welfare are central factors in attracting skilled workers. 
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  (15)   8
 
Again, higher local productivity (due to  1 Q ) and general amenities (due to 1 X ) in Area 1 will bias the 
location of unskilled workers toward that area. Notice that abundance of local amenities that specifically 
attract skilled individuals ( 1 Z ) will also tend to increase the location of unskilled workers in Area 1. When 
more skilled workers locate in Area 1, the local productivity of unskilled workers will increase, and their 
wage rises. 















































1 log log log log , equations (14) and (15) can 
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Expression (16) shows that differences in the local proportion between skilled and unskilled workers depend 
on differences in amenities that are specific to the tastes of the skilled, such as those included in vector  c Z .
6 
This is a relevant implication of our model. Indeed, Area 1 will have a higher ratio of skilled vs. unskilled 
individuals only if it is endowed, relative to Area 2, with characteristics that are particularly appreciated by 
the educated. Consequently, since the local wage-ratio (in the absence of share-altering technical change) is 


























1 > , it will also exhibit a lower skill 











1 < . These implications are summarized by the following: 
 
  Result 1. Skilled labor is cheaper in areas that are relatively rich in amenities which are particularly 
attractive to the educated. 
 
As argued in what follows, the local capacity to attract skilled individuals may be crucial for the 
implementation of skill-biased technologies.   
                                                 
6 In fact, in this Cobb-Douglas model, local general amenities ( c X ) and productivity advantages ( c Q ) affect 
skilled and unskilled individuals in the same way and, thus, they are unable to affect the local skill mix.   9
  2. Skill-biased share-altering technical change. 
Technological change has been most often represented as a shift in Total Factor Productivity, the 
term denoted by  ) ( c Y Q A  in our model. In the last decades, however, the demand for skilled workers has 
grown faster than the pool of educated workers. This observation has motivated a large body of literature, 
especially in labour economics, to investigate the so-called “skilled-biased technical change”.
7 In terms of 
production theory, technical change is skill-biased if it increases the marginal productivity of skilled workers 
relative to other factors: see Acemoglu (2002, p.785). Typically, representations of skill-biased technical 
change rely on CES production functions, as for example in Acemoglu (2002), Krusell et al. (2000) and 
Beaudry et al. (2010).
8 
Some recent literature, however, has asked what happens when technological change is represented 
as a change in the Cobb-Douglas share parameters. In particular, Seater (2005), Peretto and Seater (2008), 
and Zuleta (2008), observing the historical fall in the share of raw labour in the US, together with the 
stability of the share going to labour income, have explored some implications of the “share-altering” 
technical change hypothesis with Cobb-Douglas production functions. Such a representation of technological 
change is very convenient in our Cobb-Douglas spatial model, since we can explore the impact of an 
increase in skilled workers’ share that is exactly matched by a decrease in the unskilled share, so that the 
overall income share of labour remains unchanged. In particular, by referring to the Cobb-Douglas 
technology (1), we suppose that – at date t=0 - a new, share-altering, technology becomes available. The new 
technology is such that the share of skilled labour α  increases by  0 ≥ ∆ , while the share of unskilled labour 
β  is reduced by the same amount, so that the total labour share,  β α + , remains constant. Share-altering 
technical change is thus associated with the following production function:
9 
 
( ) ( )
∆ − ∆ + − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
β α β α u
c
s
c c c Y c N N L Q A Y
1 ) (     (17) 
 
  The following result, an immediate application of the Envelope Theorem
10, holds true: 
 
  Result 2. Each individual firm will find it profitable to adopt the share-altering technology (17) when 



















. Under local labour market clearing, this inequality is satisfied  when 
Area c is sufficiently rich in skills, that is, when it holds that: 
                                                 
7 Skill-biased technologies are a relatively recent phenomenon. As noticed in Berry and Glaeser (2005), 
Ford’s automobile mass production involved large numbers of unskilled workers.  
8 For an argument about the unsuitability of Cobb-Douglas production functions, see Acemoglu (2003, p.3). 
9 Notice that the production function (17) implies that the ratio between the marginal productivity of skilled 
labour and the marginal productivity of other factors (i.e., unskilled labour, land) is increasing in ∆. Thus, 
this form of technical change is consistent with Acemoglu’s (2002) definition of skill-biased technical 
change. 
10 See Appendix A.2 for details of the proof.   10
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, condition (18) implies the following: 
 
  Corollary 1. Each individual firm will find it profitable to adopt the share-altering technology (17) 











 This Corollary has an immediate explanation. When the new technology becomes available at date t=0, an 






 is high) is characterized by a relatively low skill-premium. Thus, the 
presence of cheap skilled labour in the local labour market may make it convenient to adopt skilled biased 
technologies: see also Beaudry et al. (2010).  
 
  Result 2 has a remarkable implication. Suppose that in Area 1 the ratio between skilled and unskilled 
individuals is greater than 1 while, in Area 2, is less than 1. Recall that, as emphasized by Result 1, this 
requires that Area 1 is relatively better endowed with those amenities that are particularly attractive to skilled 
individuals. Then, firms locating in Area 1 will find it profitable to implement the new technology (17), with 
0 > ∆ , while firms locating in Area 2 will stick to the “old” technology, given by (1). 
 
  In what follows, we give two sets of results deriving from skilled-biased share-altering technical 
change, one pertaining to the size of the skill-premium within each area, the other related to relative prices 
and populations across areas in spatial general equilibrium. 
 
  Implications for local skill-premia. When at date t=0 condition (18) is respected only in Area 1, 
Corollary 1 suggests that the local skill-premium is lower than the one in Area 2. Then, once adopted, the 
share-altering technology will have a direct positive impact on the local wage-premium: by taking as given 






















 is increasing in ∆. Thus, areas where the skilled-biased 
technology is adopted exhibit – at least, initially - an increase in the local skill-premium. 
  It is immediate to show, however, that the direct impact on the skill-premium caused by  0 > ∆  must 
be entirely compensated by re-adjustments in the local skill-mix caused by migrations over time. The proof 
for this claim, as in Glaeser (2008), goes as follows. Recall that the indirect utility of a skilled worker is   11
equal to  () ()
µ η
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
1 / ) ( c
s
c c U c U
s
r w Z B X A v , where 
s
v  denotes the “reservation utility” of skilled 
individuals across the economy (there is free-mobility). Similarly, the indirect utility of an unskilled worker 
is given by  ()
µ η
− ⋅ ⋅ =




r w X A v , where 
u
v  denotes the “reservation utility” of the unskilled in the 
economy. Thus, in equilibrium, the wage-premium in Area c is given by: 
 




















      ( 1 9 )  
 
Expression (19) shows that the skilled-unskilled wage-gap depends on amenities that affect skilled utility, 
and it does not depend on technological factors, such as ∆. Thus, as will be confirmed in what follows, there 
must occur re-adjustments in the skill-mix across areas which exactly compensate for the direct effect 
generated  by the adoption of the new technology. 
  The following statement, which replicates most results obtained under the CES approach by Beaudry 
et al. (2010), summarizes the conclusions obtained so far: 
 
  Result 3 (Skill-premia). The adoption of a skill-biased share-altering technology has a positive effect 
on the local skill-premium that is, at most, temporary. Re-adjustments in the local skill-mix will entirely 
compensate the initial positive effect, taking the local skill-premium back to its pre-adoption level. 
 
  We next consider the spatial general equilibrium implications of share-altering technical change. 
 
  Implications for spatial general equilibrium. We now explore the effects of share-altering 
technological change localized only in Area 1 on relative local prices and populations across the two regions. 
To this purpose, we will evaluate the results for an initially given skill-ratio, 
u s N N 1 1 / , set equal to the 
constant  1 0 > Σ .
11  
  Since condition (18) is satisfied in Area 1, but not in Area 2, firms in the former region adopt the 
share-altering innovation, while firms in the latter one continue to use the old technology. Under perfect 
competition in tradable good production, price (the numeraire) equals marginal cost, implying that firms 
























,    (20) 
 
                                                 
11 Moreover, derivatives in comparative statics results will be calculated by setting  0 ≈ ∆ , that is, starting 
with the same production function in both areas.   12
where  () ( )( )
∆ − ∆ + − − ∆ − ∆ + − − ≡
β α β α β α β α ϑ
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will continue to hold. Free mobility implies that, in equilibrium, firms must make zero profit no matter where 















































































   (22) 
    
  By substituting equations (7) and (9) into (22), one obtains the equilibrium rent-ratio between Area 1 
and Area 2: 
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. Differentiating (23) with respect to ∆, and 
evaluating the result for  0 ≈ ∆  and  1 0
1





















∆ > Σ ≈ ∆ β α µ d
r r d
   (24) 
 
Since  1 0 > Σ , the sign of expression (24) is positive. Thus, localized skill-biased technical change will 
increase rents in Area 1 relative to Area 2. 
Consider now the impact of the change in the skilled share on the skilled wage-ratio across areas. By 
exploiting (7), differentiating with respect to ∆, and evaluating the result for  0 ≈ ∆  and  1 0
1





obtains that:  
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  Similarly, one can use (9) to assess the impact of share-altering change on relative unskilled wages. 



































   (26) 
 
  Finally, we analyse what happens to equilibrium populations in the two areas when share-altering 
technological change occurs. As shown in Appendix A.3, the change in the ratio between skilled populations 
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Thus, a localised skill-biased technological change will generate a relative increase in the skilled 
population of that area. The opposite result generally holds for the unskilled. As shown in Appendix A.3, 
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The sign of expression (28) is ambiguous in principle. However, plausible values of the parameters 




  Expressions (27) and (28) can be exploited to find the effect of share-altering technical progress on 
the relative skill mix of the two areas.
13 Thus,  
 
                                                 
12 With µ=2/3 and α=β=1/3, expression (28) is negative when  2 log 0 < Σ ; when instead α=4/9 and β=2/9, 
(28) is negative when  4
13
0 log < Σ . Thus, if ( ) 0 logΣ >0 is not implausibly large, this derivative will have a 
negative sign. The parameterization of factor-shares is consistent with Mankiw et al. (1992). 
13 Indeed, it holds that  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ∆ − = ∆ − d n n n n d d n n n n d
u s u s u u s s / / log / log / / log / log 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 .   14
() () []
0
1 1 / log / log
1 , 0





> Σ ≈ ∆ β α d
n n n n d
u s u s
    (29) 
 
Expression (29) suggests that skilled-biased share-altering technical change localized in Area 1 will 
lead to an increase in the skilled-unskilled ratio in that region. This conclusion has a relevant implication. 
When Area 1 can adopt skilled-biased share-altering technologies (i.e., when condition (18) is satisfied), 
later on it will be ready to adopt additional technological advances of the same kind. By contrast, if the 
innovation could not be profitably adopted in Area 2, this region will remain stuck with the old technology 
also in the future. This implies that output will grow in Area 1, while Area 2 stagnates.
14   
 
The spatial general equilibrium implications are summarized by the following: 
 
Result 4 (Relative prices and population sizes across areas). When skill-biased share-altering 
technical innovation is introduced in Area 1 but not in Area 2, then Area 1 will exhibit: (i) an increase in its 
relative skilled wage; (ii) an increase in its relative unskilled wage; (iii) an increase in relative rents; (iv) an 
increase in its skilled population; (v) an ambiguous effect on unskilled population, relative to Area 2. 
Further, (vi) an increase in its skill-mix, the ratio between skilled and unskilled workers. 
 
 Thus, our model predicts that the regional skill-mix will be driven mainly by two factors: skill-
biased local amenities (i.e., amenities that mostly affect the utility of educated workers; see equation 16), and 
skill-biased technologies. 
 
                                                 
14 See also Seater (2005).   15
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The hypothesis of share-altering technical change generates two main results. The first one, mostly 
technical, is that one can represent skill-biased technical change even with Cobb-Douglas technologies. 
Indeed, we have shown how this hypothesis can replicate results that are commonly obtained under CES 
production functions, as for the spatial general equilibrium analysis by Glaeser (2008), and the labor-market 
analysis of skilled-biased technological change in Beaudry et al. (2010). 
The second main contribution of this framework is related to the spatial general equilibrium 
implications of skilled-biased share-altering technical change. In particular, the model draws some specific 
conclusions about path-dependency in regional development, which would also apply to the CES framework 
in Beaudry et al. (2010). Only areas that are sufficiently rich in human capital will be ready to adopt share-
altering technological advancements. After such changes, human capital tends to move more and more from 
areas that exhibit a relatively poor skill mix, to areas that are already rich in educated workers. As a result, 
there will be further polarization in the composition of the local labour force across the economy. This 
conclusion is consistent with the empirical results reported in Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Glaeser and 
Gottlieb (2008): areas which are rich in human capital (a pre-condition for the adoption of skilled-biased 
technologies, here) will attract a disproportionate number of skilled workers. 
 
The model raises some policy questions. The existence of relevant non-linear effects of local skills, 
documented in Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), may suggest that there can be returns from pushing skilled 
workers into already skilled areas. However, this would mean to subsidize areas that are rich in human 
capital, which seems inequitable and improper, because skilled people tend to move towards skilled places 
even without government aid. Still, our approach suggests that in an economy characterized by a low average 
level of education, it may be desirable to concentrate human capital in few specific places to get sort of areas 
of “excellence”
15 which allow for the adoption of techniques that would otherwise be unprofitable. In our 
model, this kind of intervention can be implemented by subsidizing local amenities that prove to be 
particularly attractive to educated individuals.   
 
                                                 
15 Examples of such policies in the US are given by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008, p.224-25).   16
APPENDIX 
 
A.1. Derivation of relative population sizes in equilibrium. 
  Profit maximization for firms located in area c implies that the demand for skilled labour 
s
c N , 
unskilled labour 
u
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In equilibrium, skilled labour demand 
s
c N  must be equal to its local supply 
s
c n . Also, unskilled labour 
demand 
u
c N  must be equal to local unskilled supply, 
u
c n . Finally, the local supply of land,  c l , must be equal 
to the total demand for land, which is given by the sum of land demanded by firms (as from A.1), plus the 
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c w n w n ⋅ ⋅ ,  away in (A.4), one obtains: 
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which can be substituted back into (A.2) and (A.3) to obtain:  
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    (A.8) 
 
Taking logs of (A.8) and using (10) and (11), one obtains equation (14) in the text. 




















1 ⋅ ⋅ =
l
l
    (A.9) 
 
Again, taking logs of (A.9) and using (10) and (12), one obtains equation (15) in the text. 
 
  A.2. Proof of Result 2. 
  Share-altering technical change, summarized by  0 > ∆ , will be adopted by local firms when it has a 
















































































Thus, if condition (18) holds true, profit is increasing in ∆, making the share-altering technology convenient 
to adopt. 
 
  A.3.  Populations and share-altering technological change. 
We first analyze the impact of skill-biased share-altering technological change on the relative size of 
the skilled population. It is immediate to show that, in Area 1, skilled population is now given by: 
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while for Area 2 equation (A.6) still holds. Hence, with share-altering technical change, the skilled-
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Taking the logs of (A.11), differentiating with respect to ∆, and calculating the resulting expression for ∆≈0, 
one obtains:  
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(A.12)    
which is expression (27) in the text. 
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Differentiating the log of (A.14) with respect to ∆ and calculating the result for ∆≈0, one obtains:  
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  (A.15)   
which is expression (28) in the text.   19
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